IN THEIR POLICY FORUM "PAYING PATIENTS FOR THEIR TISSUE: THE LEGACY OF HENRIETTA LACKS" (6 July, p. 37), R. D. Truog et al. overlook the L929 cell line, which, contrary to their statement about HeLa, was the fi rst immortal cell line (1) . Also overlooked are the commercial uses and questions of legal ownership fi rst raised for normal human cell strains (2) . WI-38, derived from the lung tissue of a surgically aborted fetus, has not only been used in research worldwide whenever a normal human cell is required, but has also been used as the substrate for the production of many of the world's human virus vaccines since the mid-1960s. About 2 billion people have directly benefi tted from the use of WI-38 and similar strains (3) . Although the commercial sales of vaccines produced in WI-38 cannot be accurately determined, it is certainly in the multiple billions of dollars. In the 1960s, I distributed WI-38 gratis to vaccine manufacturers and researchers worldwide because biological material could not be patented. Truog et al. seem unaware that in 1975, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and Department of Health, Education, & Welfare (DHEW) argued that the WI-38 I used in my research was the sole property of the U.S. government. I and my colleagues had never received government support for the research or development of WI-38. In response to the government's claims of propriety, we sued. We believed that there are several stakeholders in the title to any human cell culture: the researchers who actually developed the culture, their institution, the individual from whom the tissue was derived, and the organization that supported the research.
During the 7 years of litigation, several decisive events torpedoed the government's position that it had sole title to WI-38. First, the Supreme Court decided that biological material could be patented (4). This decision established the principle that, even with federal research support, biological researchers have patentable intellectual property rights for their discoveries.
Second, the Bayh-Dole Act reversed the presumption of government title. Bayh-Dole permits a university, small business, or nonprofi t institution to claim as its intellectual property the control of an invention in preference to the government and despite federal funding (5) . The act further provides that royalties be shared with the inventor.
Third, in 1983, President Reagan instructed federal agency heads that all businesses should be able to retain patent rights on inventions made in the course of government-funded R&D work. His executive order explained that giving the private sector clear title to patents on inventions developed under federal contracts and grants would lead to more rapid commercialization of new products (6) .
Fourth, the nascent biotechnology industry was then being formed by entrepreneurial biologists whose companies were founded by using biological materials discovered in federally funded university research laboratories. Thus, the NIH found itself in the untenable position of fi rst claiming sole title to WI-38 by alleging that it was discovered using federal funds and later praising the use of federal funds to discover biological materials that were then used in the founding of new biotechnology companies.
The Justice Department, which defended the NIH, FDA, and DHEW, recognized their contradictory positions and accepted an out-ofcourt settlement. This is the fi rst, and perhaps the only, instance where an individual scientist obtained federal legal title to a normal human cell strain, an event contradicted by subsequent state court decisions. The question of title to a self-duplicating human cell line or strain is still, after 50 years, a controversial issue.
Paying for Tissue: Net Benefi ts
IN THEIR POLICY FORUM "PAYING PATIENTS for their tissue: The legacy of Henrietta Lacks" (6 July, p. 37), R. D. Truog et al. oppose sharing biomedical research revenues with the patients whose tissues enable that research. They argue that "reconceptualizing tissue acquisition as an economic exchange rather than as a gift relationship" might reduce tissue donation by "crowd[ing] out" altruistic motivations. We are skeptical of this argument. The possibility of compensation might crowd out some individual donations, but other altruism-motivated donations would increase because of compensation, and nonaltruistic donations would also increase. It thus seems unlikely that net willingness to supply tissue would decline. Patients for whom compensation would truly decrease the enjoyment of donating tissues could pass on their compensation to nonprofi ts such as the American Cancer Society.
Truog et al. also argue that offering com-
1304
Routes to cooperation Probing chemical bonds pensation proportional to tissue value would be "unjust" because patients whose tissues yield "fi nancial blockbusters" would be paid more than the vast majority of donors. This argument, too, is unconvincing. "Blockbuster" cell lines make some researchers very rich, whereas other researchers do not benefi t at all; is that unjust? Moreover, it is standard to tie compensation to the value of personal characteristics such as intelligence or athletic ability. How could such a system, if applied to compensation for tissue donation, be less fair to patients than the current system, under which all revenues from tissue lines-"blockbuster" or otherwise-accrue to the medical community?
Offering value-based compensation to tissue donors would likely boost tissue supply. The great majority of patients would likely be willing to donate waste tissue in exchange for either a fi xed fee or a chance to share in the rewards of fi nancially successful research. 
Response
KOMINERS AND BECKER ARGUE THAT COMpensating patients for their tissue will increase the supply of tissue for research. But there is no evidence that lack of compensation, the current standard, is an impediment to procurement of tissue. This is tissue that will be discarded if it is not used for research, and we doubt that very many patients refuse to give permission for the use of such tissue or that those who do refuse would reconsider if offered compensation.
Kominers and Becker propose compensation mechanisms that would be complex and diffi cult to implement. Compensation to the patient could not be linked to the actual value of the tissue at the time of donation, because it is impossible to know the value of waste tissue at that point. It could be many years before it is known whether a sample has value. An alternative reimbursement scheme based on a future royalty interest would lead to substantial transaction costs and would favor patients whose identity, location, and relatives could be easily tracked over time, thereby unfairly disadvantaging those with less social stability and family integrity.
Even the suggestion to consider a compensation scheme based on a fi xed fee for all samples is problematic. If we are correct that the number of tissue samples that have little or no value dwarfs the number of those that do (an empirically testable question), the actual amount of the fi xed fee would likely be quite small. While it is diffi cult to predict the effect that a small amount of compensation would have on the willingness of patients to donate, some empirical evidence does suggest that small payments can decrease altruistic behavior in comparison with no payments at all (1). The complexity and costs to the research enterprise of any of these mechanisms would need to be justifi ed by a positive argument about why those who donate waste tissue deserve fi nancial compensation, an argument that Kominers and Becker do not provide.
Finally, on the question of fairness, we disagree with the authors that there is anything unfair about rewarding medical researchers for their ingenuity, talents, hard work, and willingness to take risks and to absorb opportunity costs in transforming medical waste into products that have scientifi c value.
We want to be clear that our Policy Forum only analyzed whether donors of waste tissue should receive fi nancial compensation. Other forms of compensation, such as recognition or commitments to use a portion of the proceeds for other worthwhile purposes, are commendable and entirely appropriate. Indeed, when the research is federally funded, all proceeds retained by the academic institution, net of expenses such as the costs of protecting intellectual property, must be used for research and educational purposes, both important public goods. The question we addressed, however, focused only on the propriety of payments to the individual and family for the use of the original discarded specimen. 
Paying for Tissue
The family of Henrietta Lacks never received any fi nancial compensation for the HeLa cell line, which was derived from the tissue that researchers obtained during her treatment for cervical cancer. Her story has raised the question of whether patients should be compensated for such tissue. In their Policy Forum (6 July, p. 37), R. D. Truog et al. argue against payment. They explain that the tissue only becomes valuable once research has been done by investigators. Once the prospect of money has been introduced, insuffi cient payments might provide a disincentive for donation. Payments would open the door to researcher biases affecting distribution, and patients would inevitably be compensated unequally, given that some cell lines lead to far more revenue than others. In their Letter (this issue, p. 1292), Kominers and Becker disagree with Truog et al. They argue that fi nancially compensating patients would likely lead to a net increase in donations. They then suggest that unequal distribution of revenue does not make the system unethical; investigators currently reap unequal rewards for their work with the tissues in question. To learn more, visit aaas.org/plusyou/rwanda
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